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UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
and an essential allegation will not be imported into the declaration by
mere inference or intendment. 7
In the instant case there was no positive, direct allegation showing the
cause of injury. It is obviously impossible to prove that a person knew
or should have known a suggested fact without first establishing the
existence of such fact. It is elementary that the allegations and the proof
must correspond, 8 and that every fact which the plaintiff must prove in
order to maintain his action should be alleged. 9
The holding in the principal case opened the door to proof of an
essential ultimate fact without positive allegation of its existence. The
opinion indicates that the Court was more impressed with the equities of
the situation than with the strict requirements of the rules of pleading.
ERWIN FLEET
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: RETRAXIT AS RES
JUDICATA, OR NOLLE PROSEQUI AS PARTIAL
BAR ONLY
Martin v. Burney, 34 So.2d 36 (Fla. 1948)
A collision between a cab owned by Burney and a car driven by Wright
resulted in injuries to plaintiff Williams, a passenger in the cab. After
Williams commenced suit against Burney and Wright, he executed an
instrument under seal for consideration, agreeing to refrain forever from
suing Wright or his insurers. He also agreed that if any suit should result
he would indemnify Wright or his insurers and that he would give them
a release in the event he should settle his claim or give a release to Burney.
(1939); 1 CnrrrY, TREATISE ON PLEADING 261 (16th Am. Ed. 1879).
'Southern Liquor Distributors, Inc. v. Kaiser, 150 Fla. 52, 7 So.2d 600 (1942);
Woodcock v. Wilcox, 98 Fla. 14, 122 So. 789 (1929); SHmMA, HANDBOOK OF COM-
moN-LAW PLEADING 77 (3d ed. 1923).
'Loftin v. McGregor, 152 Fla. 813, 14 So.2d 574 (1943) ; Pendarvis v. Pfeifer, 132
Fla. 724, 182 So. 307 (1938) ; Alexander 'v. Ballard, 95 Fla. 950, 117 So. 96 (1928) ;
Wiggins v. Wilson, 55 Fla. 346, 45 So. 1011 (1908); Atlantic C. L. R. R. v. Crosby,
53 Fla. 400, 43 So. 318 (1907).
"Alpine Forwarding Co. v. Pennsylvania R. R., 60 F.2d 734 (C. C. A. 2nd 1932);
Fuller v. Dennistoun, 164 Minn. 160, 204 N. W. 958 (1925); Timmons v. People's
Trust Co., 114 W. Va. 618, 173 S. E. 79 (1934).
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CASE COMMENTS
The covenant expressly reserved the right to Williams to proceed against
all parties other than Wright and his insurers. The attorneys for the
respective parties entered a stipulation upon the court record dismissing
the cause of action with prejudice against Williams as to the defendant
Wright. Williams continued suit against Burney. The trial court held
that the stipulation amounted to a retraxit and barred further litigation.
Plaintiff appealed. HELD, the stipulation had the effect of a covenant not
to sue rather than a retraxit. Judgment reversed.
A common-law retraxit occurs when the plaintiff enters into court
after the declaration has been filed' and makes an open and voluntary
renunciation of his entire cause of action.2 A retraxit is equivalent to a
decision on the merits and, therefore, bars all further litigation upon the
subject-matter of the action.3 The most recent decisions hold that, to
constitute a valid retraxit, satisfaction must be given in return for such
voluntary renunciation. 4  A retraxit is but one form of release; and,
since a release to one joint tort-feasor releases all,6 it follows that a re-
traxit as to one joint tort-feasor discharges all joint tort-feasors.7
A vastly different result is reached throggh the entry on the court
record of a nolle prosequi, s which states, in effect, that the plaintiff will
'Steele v. Beaty, 215 N. C. 680, 2 S. E.2d 854 (1939); Gibson v. Gibson, 20 Pa.
9 (1852); Lowry v. McMillan, 8 Pa. 157, 49 Am. Dec. 501 (1846).
23 B.. Co 2 . *296. "A retraxit differs from a nonsuit, in that the one is negative,
and the other positive. The nonsuit is a mere default and neglect of the plaintiff,
and therefore he is allowed to begin his suit again, upon payment of costs. But a
retraxit is an open and voluntary renunciation of his suit in court, and by this he
forever loses his action."
'United States v. Parker, 120 U. S. 89 (1887); Thomason v. Odum, 31 Ala. 108,
68 Am. Dec. 159 (1857); Evans v. McMahan, 1 Ala. 45 (1840); Wohiford v. Comp-
ton, 79 Va. 333 (1884).
"Hildebrand v. Delta Lumber & Box Co., 67 Cal. App.2d 88, 153 P.2d 377 (1944);
Drinkhouse v. Van Ness, 202 Cal. 359, 260 Pac. 869 (1927). Contra: Jarboe v. Smith,
10 B. Mon. 257, 52 Am. Dec. 541 (Ky. 1850).
'See Thompson v. Thompson, 23 Ky. Law Rep. 1535, 65 S. W. 457, 459 (1901).
'American Ry. Express Co. v. Stone, 27 F.2d 8 (C. C. A. 1st 1928); Allen v.
Ruland, 79 Conn. 405, 65 At. 138 (1906); Roper v. Florida Public Utilities Co., 131
Fla. 709, 179 So. 904 (1938); Louisville & N. R. R. v. Allen, 67 Fla. 257, 65 So. 8
(1914); Ellis v. Esson, 50 Wis. 138, 6 N. W. 518 (1880). Contra: Clifton v. Cara-
ker, 50 S. W.2d 758 (Mo. App. 1932), afrd, 333 Mo. 400, 62 S. W.2d 899 (1933).
'Jenkins v. Southern Pac. Co., 17 F. Supp. 840 (D. C. Cal. 1937), reversed on other
grounds, 305 U. S. 534 (1939); Bogardus v. O'Dea, 105 Cal. App. 189, 287 Pac. 149
(1930).
'Minor v. Mechanics' Bank of Alexandria, 1 Pet. 46 (U. S. 1828) ; Deloach v. Dix-
on, 7 Fed. Cas. 416, No. 3,775 (C. C. D. Ark. 1840); Lambert v. Sanford, 2 Blackf.
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not further prosecute some of the causes of action or some of the de-
fendants in the action. 9 In actions ex delicto the rule almost universally
applied is that a nolle prosequi does not bar the plaintiff from subse-
quently maintaining the action against the party not dismissed, or suing
on the causes of action not dismissed.' 0 If the parties are jointly liable
ex contractu, however, a nolle prosequi may not be entered dismissing
some of the defendants without barring further action against the other
defendants,"1 unless the defendant dismissed has pleaded in personal dis-
charge, 12 such as infancyl 3 or bankruptcy.' 4 On the other hand, if the
liability ex contractu is joint and several, the Florida Court has indicated
that a nolle prosequi as to all but one would not be a bar to further action
against the remaining defendant, since he is then being sued severally and
not jointly.' 5
Both the nolle prosequi and the retraxit are estoppels of record. The
nolle prosequi estops the plaintiff to deny the validity of his stipulation
to forbear suit, while the retraxit estops the plaintiff to deny that his
cause of action is non-existent.' 6 As a matter of practical value, the
underlying distinction between a nolle prosequi and a retraxit is of no
importance when there is only one defendant in an action, since under
137, 18 Am. Dec. 149 (Ind. 1828); Quigley v. Merritt, 4 Clarke 475 (Iowa 1857);
see Hewitt v. International Shoe Co., 110 Fla. 37, 44, 148 So. 533, 536 (1933).
9Minor v. Mechanics' Bank of Alexandria, supra note 8; Deloach v. Dixon, supra
note 8; Lambert v. Sanford, supra note 8; Quigley v. Merritt, supra note 8; Steele v.
Beaty, 215 N. C. 680, 2 S. E.2d 854 (1939) ; see Hewitt v. International Shoe Co., 110
Fla. 37, 44, 148 So. 533, 536 (1933); Hale v. Crowell's Adm'x, 2 Fla. 534, 540, 50 Am.
Dec. 301, 305 (1949).
"0 Strickland v. Wedgeworth, 154 Ala. 654, 45 So. 653 (1908); Bausewine v. Morris-
town Herald, Inc., 351 Pa. 634, 41 A.2d 736, cert. denied, 326 U. S. 724 (1945) ; see
United States v. Linn, 1 How. 104, 107 (U. S. 1843); Lally v. Cash, 18 Ariz. 574, 164
Pac. 443, 444 (1917).
"1Hale v. Crowell's Adm'x, 2 Fla. 534, 50 Am. Dec. 301 (1849); Tolman v. Spauld-
ing, 4 fll. 13 (1841).
"2 Hamer v. Pennell, 86 F.2d 227 (C. C. A. 5th 1936); Mayer v. Brensinger, 180 IIl.
110, 54 N. E. 159 (1899).
"Woodward v. Newhall, 1 Pick. 500 (Mass. 1823); Taylor v. Dansby, 42 Mich. 82,
3 N. W. 267 (1879).
1 4Godnow v. Hill, 125 Mass. 587 (1878).
"5 See Harrington v. Bowman, 106 Fla. 86, 91, 143 So. 651, 653 (1932), quoting
dictum in Springstead v. Crawfordsville State Bank, 63 Fla. 267, 273, 57 So. 668, 670
(1912). But cf. Minor v. Mechanics' Bank of Alexandria, 1 Pet. 46 (U. S. 1828);
Massey v. Farmer's Nat. Bank of Va., 104 Ill. 327 (1882); Peyton v. Scott, 3 Miss.
870 (1838).
"See Thompson v. Thompson, 23 Ky. Law Rep. 1535, 65 S. W. 457, 458 (1901).
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